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Accountability and liability of managers
for protecting the public from wildlife should
not assume an unrealistic ability to forecast
attacks approaching the certainty of 20:20
hindsight after an attack. Although analysis
of past attacks can yield valuable insights,
it is likely to create exaggerated perceptions
of average risk, of how much risk can be
reduced by management actions, and of how
predictable individual animals are during
any given encounter. Such exaggeration can
be minimized by understanding each species’
aggression within the whole scope of its social
behavior, body language, and interactions with
humans.
Wildlife managers are responsible for
keeping the public safe from wildlife, as well
as for conserving wildlife species that, at least,
occasionally injure or kill someone. Managers
should balance the demands of public safety
with those of public freedom to enjoy wildlands
without killing animals unnecessarily. This is a
balancing act that would work best if managers
could make ballpark estimates of risk of
attack under a wide range of scenarios, then
tailor countermeasures to each scenario. Both
estimating risks and countering them could
be done in ways that assure accountability of
managers who fail to act responsibly, yet, protect
wise and diligent managers from unwarranted
liability.
The difficulties of this challenge are
emphasized by the recent judgment against the
U.S. Forest Service (USFS) for nearly $2 million.
The award was made to the family of Samuel
Ives, the 11-year-old boy who was camping with
his family in Utah’s Uintah National Forest, was
killed by a black bear (Ursus americanus; Francis
versus State of Utah 2010). At approximately

0500 hours on that same day, and at the very
same campsite, the bear had ripped into another
tent and struck another man in the head without
injuring him. The victim and his friends drove
the bear away, then, reported the incident to the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (UDWR),
which sent personnel with dogs to trail the bear
and kill it. When the bear’s trail was eventually
lost several kilometers away and hours later,
the trackers gave up for the day. Although an
off-duty USFS law enforcement officer was
notified of the morning incident, the report was
not passed on to other authorities who might
have assured that warnings were posted and
that campers were verbally informed of the
incident. Because of this oversight, the court
found the USFS negligent, resulting in the boy’s
death (Kevan Francis and Rebecca Ives versus
United States of America). A separate suit was
initiated against UDWR (Francis versus State of
Utah 2010).
Without a fuller knowledge of those events
and a deeper understanding of relevant law, I
would not wish to question the court’s decision.
Nevertheless, I cannot ignore the wave of
apprehension that this case is sending through
wildlife-wildland management agencies. How
will the Ives case affect future management of
potentially lethal wildlife? Will agencies devote
more of their dwindling resources to research
on human–wildlife conflicts to keep improving
methods of protecting the public without
shortchanging their other responsibilities? Or
will sympathy for victims, sensitivity to bad
press, and fear of exploitive litigation force
agencies to focus on more direct means of
defending themselves to forestall lawsuits or to
win them in courts of law?
One of the most counterproductive forms of

6
agency self-defense is excessively uniform and
simplistic policy. Presumably, as long as there
is official consensus within an agency or among
agencies on which safety precautions to use, no
one implementing them can be singled out for
blame if and when they fail. Uniformity also
facilitates educating agency personnel and the
public about wildlife safety, because everyone
is sending and receiving the same KISS (KeepIt-Simple-Stupid) messages.
Nevertheless, any simplistic, 1-size-fits-all,
set of precautions for a species is doomed to
mediocrity. I offer the following 5 characteristics
for a more sophisticated management policy.
1. It should be cost effective. Except in the case
of emergency actions, any new precaution
should be screened to assure that the
gains in public safety outweigh any new
constraints on public freedom in wildlands.
For example, what would the costs and
benefits to the public be of forbidding them
to bicycle or walk dogs in a national forest or
park frequented by bears? How would those
policies affect wildlife?
2. A species, such as bear, should not be killed
to increase public safety unless it poses a
substantive risk and not merely pro forma
because someone was frightened by the
animal. Risk assessment should be based
both on analysis of previous attacks and
on knowledge about bear behavior that has
not led to attacks. For example, managers
should learn to distinguish offensive versus
defensive threats and to recognize how
likely any given behavior (e.g., jaw popping
or pant huffing) is to presage a bear trying
to injure either a human or a another bear
(Stringham 2011).
3. Pressures for uniformity should not be
allowed to stifle adaptation of management
practices to situational variations in the
ways that animals interact with humans.
For example, agencies might continue to
allow closely viewing of brown bears (Ursus
arctos) and black bears on the Pacific coasts
of Alaska and British Columbia where these
animals are especially tolerant of one another
and of people, but keep viewers farther from
bears in habitats where the bruins are much
less forgiving (Smith et al. 2005, Herrero et
al. 2005). Viewers might be allowed greater
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flexibility when natural foods are abundant
than when they are scarce and bears are
less tolerant. Viewing might be encouraged
only at sites where bears and people on
foot can usually see one another from a
distance of at least 100 m, but discouraged
where bears and people frequently surprise
one another at much closer distances.
Habituation might be encouraged in
situations where the benefits of reducing
bear defensiveness—the leading cause
of brown bear inflicting serious or fatal
injuries (Herrero 1985)—outweigh any
increase in offensive aggression (Stringham
2009, 2010). Professionals might be allowed
to provide food to bears to lure them away
from residential areas (Rogers 2011); but,
all feeding of bears might continue to be
forbidden where the reverse is true.
4. Policy should guide managers in making
cost:benefit analyses. If numerous people
are at risk from a bear, how much would
their risk have to be reduced to compensate
for any consequent increase in risk for a
much smaller number of other people?
For example, caribou (Rangifer tarandus)
herds cross rivers each year, and numerous
calves drown. Suppose the carcasses
float downstream until they hang up on
sandbars in an area frequented by anglers
and brown bears are attracted to the
carcasses. Recognizing high danger that
some angler may be attacked by a carcassdefending bear, a proactive manager might
decide that the carcasses must be moved
and that the only feasible way is to float
them downstream to areas seldom visited
by people. Unfortunately, in the event that
someone is mauled by a bear defending a
relocated carcass, the likelihood that the
relocation saved other people from injury
might be offset by its elevating the risk to
100 percent for another individual. A similar
problem might arise when managers haze
a bear away from numerous anglers or
from a residential area. The bear then may
go toward another person, injuring him, a
scenario the manager had not forseen.
5. Policy should assure that managers meet at
least minimum standards of due diligence
in each scenario that they are likely to face.
Unlike attorneys who study past tragedies
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to fix blame and liability, biologists study
them to prevent future tragedies. Also,
unlike attorneys, we biologists do not make
our living by playing Monday-morningquarterback, focusing on a rare tragedy
and dissecting it with the certainty of 20:20
hindsight. Hindsight concerning an attack
might imply that once events A, B, and C
occurred, tragedy was virtually inevitable.
Indeed, if a bear has even once tried to prey
on a human, most managers would expect
more of the same and try to remove the bear.
Some agencies might also do so even if a
bear breaks into an occupied tent, as in the
Ives case. However, if a bear’s offense was
merely foraging in campsites or defensively
threatening someone who had stoned it,
would this offense really increase risk of
predatory attack by this bear? By how
much?
Merely knowing that factors A, B, and C
might increase the likelihood of tragedy does
not tell us how high that likelihood is (e.g.,
one in 102, 105, or 108 encounters). Nor does
that knowledge alone enable us to predict the
specific encounter during which A, B, and C
will have tragic consequences, rather than
the innocuous consequences they have had
during countless other encounters. Precision
and accuracy of prediction are limited by what
is known about all the factors contributing to
an encounter’s outcome. The more managers
know, the better they can forecast optimal
actions for meeting their numerous competing
priorities with limited resources.
Identifying reliable risk predictors has
been the goal of numerous studies on large
carnivores, especially (a) bears (Herrero 1970,
1985; Herrero and Higgins 1999, 2003; Herrero
et al. 2011; Miller and Tutterow 1998; Smith et
al. 2005), (b) cougars (Deurbrouck and Miller
2001, Etling 2001, Mattson et al. 2011), and (c)
wolves (McNay 2002, Graves 2007, Geist 2007).
There also have been studies on ungulates
(Geist 1978, 2011; Walther 1984).
Popular accounts of bear attacks commonly
are stated as simple, qualitative associations.
Such an account, for example, might state that
the majority of large North American mammals
that kill or seriously injure people have at least
one of the following traits: they are habituated,
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food conditioned, ill, injured, or malnourished;
or, they are unskilled at foraging, capturing
prey or coexisting with humans; or they have
a history of prior aggression. So, too, a popular
account might state that most victims have at
least one of the following characteristics: they
surprised the animal at close range; or, hey
were associated with foods or other things that
attracted the animal. Additionally, they might
have been perceived by the animal as vulnerable;
as resembling prey; as competing with the
animal for space, territory, food or mates; or as
threatening the animal or its offspring.
Professional reports, on the other hand, are
more likely to quantify associations, sighting
the percentage of cases where the animal or
the victim had one or more of those traits. This
is illustrated by the findings of Herrero et al.
(2011) that were based on all 63 instances of
someone being killed by a black bear in North
America since 1900:
• Of 56 fatal attacks by black bears, 88%
were predatory;
• Of 36 fatal attacks, 92% were inflicted by
an adult or subadult male; and
• 91% pf victims killed by black bears were
alone or with just 1 other person.
Based an such statistics, if someone were to
be killed by a black bear, one might confidently
predict that the culprit was a predatory adult or
subadult male and that the victim was alone or
with a single companion.
However, such a conclusion would be made
of course, after someone had been killed. It
is not clear how such statistics can best help
managers predict the likelihood of attack before
one occurs. For example, what do Herrero’s
statistics tell us about risk of predatory attack
in California or in any other state or province
where no one has been killed by a black bear
in the last 110+ years—the same situation that
existed in Utah until the Ives boy was killed? In
fatality-free areas, are adult and subadult males
really 11-fold more dangerous than females?
And if so, how dangerous are females, e.g., 1
nonfatal attack per 103, 105, or 107 encounters
with a human?
Extrapolations from known killers to entire
populations or metapopulations of a species
are best treated as hypotheses in need of
verification. The need for caution is perhaps
best illustrated by recalling that most people
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who kill other people are also adolescent or
adult males. Yet, most human males never try
to kill anyone. Case-by-case quantification of
attack-risk by either bears or people requires
information on a lot more variables than just
age, sex, and species. For example, how much
could risk of attack by an adult male black
bear be altered (e.g., 0.1%, 50%, or 99.9%) by
factors, such as shortage of wild foods, access
to anthropogenic foods, conditioning of bears
to those foods, habituation of bears to people,
density of the bear population, or sport hunting
of bears or ungulates? How much might a
government agency reduce risk for visitors to
a park by providing them with a bear-safety
brochure, warning signs, or verbal instructions?
How much can visitors reduce their own risk
by following those precautions, e.g., wearing
bear-bells while hiking or by surrounding tents
with an electric fence?
Statistics for attacks by bears would be most
useful if they were directly comparable to
statistics for more familiar animals, such as
dogs, horses, and bees. The common practice of
simply contrasting the numbers of people injured
or killed by each species is highly misleading
because it does not address differences in
exposure (see Pritchard 2000). Exposure is partly
a function of abundance of each species. When
abundance is considered, the >5-fold higher
annual lethal attack rate for all dogs over all
bears (16 people killed by dogs versus 3 people
killed by bears per year; Herrero 1985, Sacks
et al. 2000) becomes a 19-fold higher rate per
bear than per dog (1/220,000 bears versus 1/4.2
million dogs; Stringham, unpublished report).
Even more insightful figures could be obtained
if we could limit calculations to the numbers of
bears and dogs that encounter a human and to
the numbers of people who encounter a bear or
a dog. Then, risks could be compared in terms
of attacks per person per animal per encounter.
Indeed, probability of being mauled during an
encounter should be separated from probability
of having an encounter, as Mattson et al. (2011)
did for pumas (Puma concolor). This distinction
is essential for evaluating risk factors (e.g.,
habituation), given that those which raise or
lower probability of encounters may have a
different effect on probability of attack during
an encounter.
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Continent-wide summary statistics on
risk levels and on factors that control risk
level should eventually be integrated into a
cumulative risk model that is designed so that
managers could input knowledge about their
local bear population. Then, such statistics
should allow the model to compute both
local baseline risk and how much risk could
be modified above or below baseline by each
environmental change (e.g., climatic warming)
or management option.
Without such information, how can managers
assess the cost-effectiveness of each option so
that their resources can be focused where they do
most good to enhance public safety and to meet
their other responsibilities, while minimizing
unwarranted liability? How are managers,
administrators, judges, juries or the general
public to avoid either vastly overestimating or
underestimating the benefits of each precaution
that managers could implement? How are
judges and juries to avoid overestimating the
capacity of managers to prevent attacks without
unacceptably constraining public enjoyment of
wildlife and without preventively killing far too
many benign animals? How are they to assess
liability based on realistic understanding of the
limitations of managers to predict and control
what wildlife will do?
Producing and implementing management
plans with the 5 characteristics listed above
would be markedly facilitated by better support
for innovative research on wildlife behavior.
If ursid predatory behavior had been better
understood, then the quick return of the bear to
the Ives campsite might have been predicted and
adequate countermeasures taken. Knowledge
can save both lives and money.
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